ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
" 1. 1 am of opinion that the title of
the act, ' to compromise and settle the
bonded indebtedness of the state of Tennessee,' sufficiently expresses the subject
thereof; that it contains 'but one subject,
the several sections of tht act being pertinent to the object expressed in the
title, and, therefore, it is not void, as
being repugnant to sect. 17, of art. 2,
of the Constitution of Tennessee.
"2. I am further of opinion that the
courts of the state have no power to
review or reverse the legislative action
of the General Assembly, except for the
reason that such action is a violation of
the Constitution ; and that such action,
if within their constitutional power,
cannot be questioned by the courts of
the state upon allegations of fraud and
bribery.
"3. I am also of opinion that taxpaying citizens may file their bill to protect themselves from the injurious operation of a threatened and impending act,
which is alleged to be unconstitutional,
although such act is about to be performed under the apparent authority of
the state.
The court may inquire if
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there exists legal authority for the act,
if so, it will not impede or obstruct it.
On the other hand, if it appears it is
prohibited by the fundamental law, it
should restrain it upon the ground that
the injurious act about to be done is
unauthorized by law.
"4. I am, therefore, of the opinion
that the constitutionality of the act is
fairlypresented to this court for its decision, and that the question for our
deliberation is, had the legislature the
power to pass it ? And in my opinion
it had the power-there being no inhibition or restraint in the Constitution to
prevent it from doing so.
"1I therefore concur with Judge
EWING in holding that the act is constitutional and valid, and that the chancellor's decree dismissing the bill should
be affirmed."
It is proper to explain that no one
opinion can be called the opinion of the
court, but that of Mr. Justice McFARLAND discusses all the points on which
a majority of the judges agreed, and
is, therefore, selected for publication in
full.
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ACkNOWLEDGMENT.

Married Woman-Evidence.-A married woman's acknowledgment
I Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1881. The cases will probably appear in 14 or 15 Otto.
2 From B. D. Turner, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 37 Arkansas Reports.
s From J. Hl. Lumpkin, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 66 Georgia, Reports.
4 From J. Shaaff Stockett, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in 56 Maryland Reports.
r From John Lathrop, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 131 Massachusetts Reports
6 From T. K. Skinker, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 74 Missouri Reports.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

to a deed properly certified, is primafacie, but not conclusive evidence
against her, either that the acknowledgment was made as certified, or
that the facts acknowledged were true, except as to a vendee for valuable consideration, ignorant of the falsity of the facts, and not participant
in the fraud. As to him, she is estopped to deny an acknowledgment
actually made : Holt v. .Moore, 37 Ark.
Omission of" Purposes."-An acknowledgment of a mortgage which
does not show that the mortgage was executed for the "purposes"
therein expressed, is insufficien.t to admit it to record ; and the mortgage is no lien upon the property, as against a subsequent purchaser,
even with notice : Ford v. Burks, 37 Ark.
ATTACHMENT.

See Garnishment.

ATTORNEY.

Power to Compromise Suit.-An attorney as such, has no power to
compromise claims placed in his hands for collection, or in respect to
which he may be employed to recover judgment. He can take nothing
in satisfaction of the claim 'or judgment except money, nor can he
receive a less sum than is really due thereon, without the express
authority of his client obtained for the purpose. And if he assume to
act without such express authority, his acts in making the compromise,
or agreeing to take a less sum in satisfaction than is really due, will not
bind the client unless the latter, with full knowledge of all the facts,
has ratified what has been done by the attorney; though such ratification may be inferred from acquiescence, and from the facts and circumstances of the case : Fritchey v. Bosley, 56 Md.
BANK.

See Taxation.

BANKRUPTCY.

Discharge-Subscript
ion to Stock of Corporation-Debtof Fiduciary
Character.-There is nothing of a fiduciary relation or character created
by a subscription of the debtor to the stock of a corporation, more than
exists in the ordinary relation of debtor and creditor; and an action to
recover such subscription is barred by the discharge: JMorrison v.
Savage, 56 Md.
BILLs AND NOTES. See Executors and Administrators.
When a Sealed Instrument-Statute of Limitations.-To render a
promissory note a sealed instrument it should be so recited in the body
of the note. The mere addition of66aGeo.
seal after the signature is not
sufficient: Chambers v. Kingsbury,
A note in the usual form, but with a seal added after the signature,
will be barred after six years from maturity: Id.
COM MON CARRIER.

Negligence-Limitation of Liability-Live Stock.-Though a shipper
of live stock contracted with the transporting railroad that it was not to
be responsible for attention, feeding or watering of the stock, but that
it should afford the shipper reasonable facilities for those purposes, yet
if the railroad carried the stock beyond the destination fixed by the bill
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of lading, and there de'tained them for several days before their return, it
would not be relieved from liability for failure to care for the stock after
passing the proper destination : Bryant v. Southwestern Railroad Co.,
66 Geo.
See Telegraph.
CONTRACT.
COPYRIGHT.

Infringement-Proofof Deposit of Books with Librarianof Congress,
Essential- Certificate of Librarian.-The deposit with the librarian of'
Congress of two copies of a copyrighted publication is an essential condition of the proprietor's right, and must be proved in an action fcr
infringement: . ierrillv. Tice, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1881.
A memorandum of such deposit upon a copy of the record of the title
page, certified by the librarian of Congress, is not competent evidence
thereof: Id.
Whether the certificate of the librarian, under his official seal, that
the books had been deposited would be competent evidence of such
deposit., gucere: Id.
CORPORATION.

Transfer of Stock-When complete.-In the absence of a legislative
enactment restricting the transfer of stock to any particular mode, the
transfer is complete on delivery of the certificate with power to transfer,
and payment of the purchase-money, not only between vendor and vendee, but when the corporation has unjustifiably refused to make the
transfer on its books, against a creditor of the vendor, who, without
notice of the transfer, attaches the stock : Xerchants' NYat. Bank v.
Richards, 74 Mo.
CRIMINAL LAW.

Breaking Partition Pence- Trespass.-It is not a misdemeanor for
one to break a partition fence between his lot and another's, and which
is the common property of both. Nor is it a trespass for him to
knock off the plank added to it by the other; but destruction of such
fence would be a trespass: Drees v. Th]e State, 37 Ark.
DEED.

See Name.

Gift in restraint of Marriage- Construction of Deed- Validity.W. H. C., in consideration of one dime and of natural love and affection, conveyed by deed certain leasehold property to his two sisters M.
and E., "to have and to hold the same unto the said M. and E. as tenants in common so long as they both shall live, and from and after the
death of either of them, then unto the survivor so long as she shall
live and no longer, or so long as they both shall remain unmarried; and
from and after the marriage of either of them, then unto the one remainI. married,
ing unmarried, so long as she shall live and no longer."
and E., who remained unmarried, took exclusive possession of the
premises. Upon an ejectment brought by M. and her husband to
recover an undivided moiety of the premises, it was held that the purpose of the brother evidently was, not to restrain the marriage or pro,
mote the celibacy of his sisters, but to give them a small property as a
home or support until they should severally marry and have husbands
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to maintain them ; and that there was nothing immoral or illegal in this
purpose, and it. was carried out by this deed without infringing any rule
of law: Arthur v. Cole, 56 Md.
ERRORS AND

APPEALS.

Limitation under sect. 1008 Rev. Stat.-Applies to State Courts.The limitation of two years prescribed by sect. 1008 Revised Statutes
for bringing writs of error to the Circuit and District Courts applies to
writs of error to state courts : Cummings v. Jones, S. C. U. S., Oct.
Term 1881.
Construction of State Statute-Decisionby Circuit Court-Subseguent
contrary Decision of State Court-Erroneoussustaining of Demurrer to
one Replication.-The construction given by the Supreme Court of a
state to a statute of limitations of the state will be followed by the
United States Supreme Court in a case decided the other'way in the
Circuit Court before the decision of the state court: Moores v. Citizens'
Nat. Bank, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1881.
- The erroneous sustaining of a demurrer to a replication to one of several defences in the answer, requires the reversal of a final judgment
for the defendant which is not clearly shown by the record to have
proceeded upon other grounds : Id.
erdict.-A judgment will not be reversed at the instance
Practiceof the party against whom it was rendered on the ground that the verdict was for but half the amount shown by the evidence to be due if
any recovery at all was to be had: Alderman v. Cox, 74 Mo.
EXECUTION.

Levy on Real Estate-N2ot satisfaction.-A levy on real estate undisposed of is not prima facie evidence of satisfaction of the fi.fa., as is
the case with a levy on personalty: Overby v. Hart, 66 Ga.
That a fi.fa. has been levied on land, a claim interposed and dismissed, and the fi.fa. ordered to proceed, will not prevent a levy on
other realty or require the ft. fa. to proceed on the original levy
first: Id.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.

See Notice.

Promissory Note-Sgning as Administrator.-An administrator who
signs a note describing himself as administrator becomes personally liable, unless he expressly stipulates to pay out of the estate only: Studebaker Bros. Man. Co. v. Montgomery, 74 Mo.
GARNISHMENT.

Interrogatories- What allowable.-In a trustee process, the plaintiff
may put interrogatories to the trustee calculated to elicit facts which
will tend to charge him, but not to contradict or impeach him : Nutter
v. Framingham& Lowell RailroadCo., 131 Mass.
Nortgage- Right of Attaching-creditor to redeem.-An attachingcreditor cannot maintain an action to redeem land covered by his
attachment from a mortgage executed by the debtor: Fisher v. Tallman, 74 Mo.
VOL. XXX.-44
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GUARDIAN AND WARD.

,ettlement with Ward- What information necessary-Ac-uiescence.
-'Receipts in full and final settlement, given to-a guardian by his ward
after becoming of age and acquiesced in for more than four years, are
prima face binding upon her: Steadham v. Sims, 66 Geo.
If a guardian settle with his ward out of court., it is his duty to
inform her concerning the condition of her estate, that she may act
with full knowledge, but it is not incumbent on him in all cases to
make a precise and detailed statement of receipts and expenditures,
debts with interest on them, &c.: Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Divorce-Alimony-Deree for Specific Personal Property.-A
decree vesting in the wife specific personal property of the husband, as
alimony in gross, is valid, at least when made in pursuance of an agreement of the parties : Crews v. Mooney, 74 Mo.
Such a decree, even if it were beyond the power of the court to make
it, could not be avoided in a collateral action : Id.
Divorce-Decree against Non-resident-Effect of.-Judgments in
personam are not binding upon persons living beyond the limits of the
state, unless they voluntarily appear and answer the suit: Garner v.
'Garner, 56 Md.
Where the defendant in a divorce suit is a non-resident, the jurisdiction of the court is limited to the dissolution of the marriage : .d.
Where the decree goes farther and says the defendant shall not marry
again, such prohibition is nbt necessarily a part of the decree dissolving
the marriage, but is in the nature of a decree inpersonam, affecting the
rights of a party beyond the jurisdiction of the court, and so much of
the decree is invalid: Id.
Purchaseby Husbandwith Wife's jlfoney-Bona fide Purchasersfrom
BEusband.-If a husband uses the money of his wife, with or without
her consent, and thereby acquirestitle in himself to property, third
persons who bona fida take title for value to such property will be protected: Gorman v. Wood, 66 Geo.
M~ortgage by Wife to secure luMsband's Debt-Parol Evidence to
videntifij Debt.-A mortgage was given by a husband and wife on her
land to A., as security for sales of goods to be made by him to the husband. Held, that parol evidence was admissible to show that the
liabilitids which the mortgage was intended to secure were those to be
incurred by the husband to a firm of which A. was a member; and
that it was immaterial that the wife did not know of the existence of
the firm when she executed the mortgage, or when the subsequent purchases of goods were made : Hall v. Tay, 131 Mass.
INSURANCE.

Wagering Contract-Assignment of Policj to one not having Insurable lIterest.-The assignment of a policy to a party not having an
insurable interest is as objectionable as the taking out of a policy in his
name. Nor is its character changed because it is for a portion merely
of tthe iinsurance money. To the extent in which the assignee stipu.
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lates for the proceeds of the policy beyond the sums advanced by him
he stands in the position of one holding a wager policy : WMirnock v.
Davis, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1881.
For all sums collected by such assignee upon the policy in excess of
the moneys advanced by him the courts will compel him to account to
the representatives of the deceased: d.
Policsfor use of Third Person-Right to recover backc Premiums.If a policy insures the life of A. for the use of B., A. cannot maintain
an action against the insurer for the premiums paid by him on the
policy, although the policy never took effect by reason of fraud on the
part of the agents of the insurer : Trabandt v. Conn. .Afut. Life Ins.
Co., 131 Mass.
JUDGMENT.

Power of Court to Set Aside- United States Courts not controlled by
State Statutes or Practice of State Courts-Lahes in applying .for
Relief.-It is a general rule that all judgments, decrees or orders are
under the control of the court which pronounces them, during the term
at which they are rendered, but that after the term is ended they are
beyond such control: Bronson v. Schulten, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term
1881.
To this rule there has always existed an exception founded on the
common-law writ of error coran vobis which brought before the same
-court where the error was committed certain mistakes of fact not put in
issue or passed upon by the court, such as the death of one of the parties when the judgment was rendered, coverture of a female party,
infancy and failure to appoint a guardian, error in the process or mistake of the clerk. But if the error was in the judgment itself the writ
did not lie. What was formerly done by this writ is now attained by
motion and affidavits : Id.
Some of the state courts have a larger power conferred by statute,
and others have extended their power by asserting a control over their
judgments and administering equitable relief in a summary way.
Neither the state statutes nor the practice of the state courts can control the United States Courts : Id.
Negligence and laches of the party in discovering the mistake will
bar his right to relief: 1d.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Re-?etting to Tenant after Judgment for Possession-Effect of-A
Te-letting of the premises to a tenant after recovering a judgment for
possession against him, is a satisfaction of the judgment, and an execution on the judgment after the new lease will be enjoined : Barney v.
Cain, 37 Ark.
Sub-lease for whole of Unexpired Term-Liability of Sub-lessee.The lessee of an estate for a term of years, at a fixed rent payable
,quarterly, and who had covenanted to pay taxes, demised it to another
for a term equal to the whole of the unexpired term of the original
lease, by a lease containing covenants by the lessee to pay rent monthly
at an increased rate, and taxes, and providing that the lessor might
enter and take possession for breach of covenant, and that the lessee
would quit and deliver up the premises'to the lessor at the end of the
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term. Held, that this was a sub-lease and not an assignment of the
original lease; and that the sub-lessee was not liable to the original
lessor upon the covenant to pay the taxes in the original lease : Dunlap v. Bullard, 131 Mass.
LEGACY.
When not a Charge on Land.-Legacies and annuities, whether pay-

abl by an executor o a devisee, are not to be considered charges upon
real estate, unless the intention of the testator to' charge it is either
expressly declared or may be fairly inferred from the will: Owens V.
Claytor, 56 Md.
A testatrix, being seised of an undivided two-thirds interest in a tract
of land, containing one hundred and twenty-five acres, devised to her
son John forty acres thereof, and to her son Frank the remaining forty• three acres. In a subsequent clause in the will she gave to her niece
Mary her bedroom furniture, and also an annuity, in the following
terms ;"It is likewise my will that each of my sons, Frank and John,
shall pay to my said niece Mary the sum of $30 per annum, in equal
instalments every two months :" held, that the annuity thus given must
be considered as a mere charge on the devisees in respect of the land
dised to them, and not a charge on the land itself: Id.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

Malice -Proof of -- When presumed.-To
maintain an action for
maliciously attaching the plaintiff's goods, it is not necessary to prove
that the defendant, in suing out the attachment, acted dishonestly or
with actual malice. If there was no probable cause to believe that the
facts alleged in the affidavit for the attachment were true, the jury may
presume malice: .Bozeman v. Shaw, 37'Ark.
MASTER AND SERVrANT.

Dangerous fachiner-y - Youth and inexperience of Servant - Viceprincipal.-W here a servant, engaged in operating machinery, is by
reason of his youth and inexperience, not aware of the danger to which
he is exposed, it is the duty of his master to warn him, if he himself
knows of it, and this notwithstanding the existence of that which renders the niachinery dangerous is known to the servant: Dowling vAllen, 74 Mo.
A foreman in charge of a distinct piece of work in an extensive
foundry, and having under him laborers bound to obey his orders, is,
as to them, a vice-principal to their employer, and not their fellowservant, and -this although another may be general foreman of the entire establishment, with authority over him: Id.
MECHANIC'S LIEN.

Conti-actor not Agent for Ooner-feasure of val,e of MaterialsDeclairationsof Contri-ctor.-The Mechanic's Lien Law does not establish the relation of principal and agent between the owner and contractor. Prices agreed upon between the latter and a material-man are,
therefore, not binding upon the owner. As against him only the market value of the materials can be recovered. The agreed prices will,
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however, be received as prima facie evidence of the market value:
Deardorffv. Everhartt, 74 Mo.
For the same reason, declarations of the contractor (e. g. that materials purchased by him were used in a particular building) are not evidence against the owner. Overruling Morrison v..Hancock, 40 Mo.
561: i.
A lien cannot be enforced against a building for materials furnished
to the contractor but not put into the building : Id.
MINING.

MORTGAGE.

See lnited States.
See Acknowledgment..

Of undivided Interest- Subsequent .Partition.-Amortgage of an
undivided, moiety in land will not be transferred and limited to the
whole of a particular part of it allotted to the mortgagor in severalty
by a subsequent partition between the co-tenants to which the mortgagee was not a party nor assented: Jackman v. Beck, 37 Ark.
MUNICIPAL 0CORPORATION.

See Taxation.

NAIME.

Terin 4 Junior"-Fatherand Son of Same Name-Presumption as
to Conve/ance-Evidence.-The term "Junior" is no part of a mai's
name: Simpson v. Dix, 131 Mass.
If a son, who bears the same name as his father, buys land in his own
name, without the designation of " Junior" added thereto, there is no
presumption of law that he intended that his father should take the title
to the land : d.
If land is conveyed to J. S., and there are two persons of that name, a
father and son, there is no presumption that the fathdr is intended;
and evidence is admissible to show who is the grantee: Id.
See Gommon Carrier; Xaster and Servant.
Ice on Sidewalks- Contributory/ Negligene-Evidence.-The fact
that a person noticed, on entering a building, that there was ice and
snow on a plank sidewalk in front of the door, is not conclusive evidence, in an action by him against the owner of the building for an
injury sustained on his way out of the building in consequence of such
snow and ice, that he was not in the exercise of due care in attempting
to pass over the sidewalk: Dewire v. Bailey, 131 Mass.
NEGLIGENCE.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

Stolen Coupons-Purchase after Maturity-_Presumption as to Previous Negotiation.-In an action of replevin for interest boupons, payable to bearer,,the case was submitted on agreed facts, which stated that
the bonds, to which the coupons were then attached, were before
maturity stolen from the plaintiff; that after maturity they were
bought by a person named, in good faith, and passed through the hands
of several persons named until they came into the possession of the
defendant, and that all these persons were purchasers in good faith and
for value. Held, that there was no presumption that the thief had
negotiated the coupons before maturity; and that the plaintiff was
entitled to judgment: Hinckley v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 131 Mass.
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NOTICE.

Purchase by Execator-PassingTitle through Third Person.-Two
executors sold realty of their testator; a third party bought; on the
same day he conveyed the land to one of the executors individually;
some two years thereafter the latter sold to a purchaser for value; the
deeds on their faces all purported to be for a fair and valuable consideration. Zeld, that in the absence of all actual notice, the facts appearing
from the recorded deedA, were not sufficient to put the purchaser on notice
that the sale was by an executor to himself: Cox v. Barber, 66 Geo.
PARENT AND CHILD.

Custody of Child- Who entitled to.-In deciding contests upon writs
of habeas corpus for the custody of infant children, the principles
adopted in the chancery court must govern. No rigid rules to govern
the practice have or can be formulated. Subject to a few general rules
to be taken as a guide, the'chancellor must exercise his judgment upon

the peculiar circumstances of the caise, and act as humanity, respect for
the parental affection and regard'for the infant's best interests may
prompt. All three should be considered. Neither should be conclusive : Verser v. Ford, 37 Ark.
As against strangers, the father, however poor and humble, if of
good moral character and able to support the child in his own style of
life, cannot be deprived of the privilege by any one whatever, however
brilliint the advantage he may offer. It is not enough to consider the
interest of the child alone. And as betweetil father and mother, or
other near relation of the child, where sympathies of the tenderest
nature may be confidently relied on, the father is generally to be preferred : l.
PARTITION.

See Mortgage.

PARTNERSHIP.

Appropriation of .PartnershipFunds-Questionfor the Jury.-An
appropriation of partnership funds or effects by one partner without the
previous knowledge and consent of his coparthers, to the payment of a
debt which the creditor knew at the time was the private debt of the
particular partner, is presumptively fraudulent: Johnson v. Crichton,
56 Md.
The presumption of fraud or malafides, however, in respect to such
transaction, may be rebutted by proof of authority given by the other
partners, or of their knowledge and consent, or of their ratification : Id.
Whether such authority or consent was given by the copartner, is a
question for the jury : Id.
SALE.

iS'tock of Goods- Opportunity of Inspection-Reresentations.-A
buyer of an interest in a stock of goods and in a business, who has
ample opportunity afforded him to examine the goods and the books
of the business, has no right to rely upon representations of the seller
concerning the value of the goods or of the amount of business which
the sellerIhas previously done: Poland v. Brownell, 131 Mass.
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improvement for benefit of Particular District-Presumption as to.,
determination of Councils-Relief from Local Assessment.-Where
there is nothing upon the face of an ordinance, authorizing a particular
improvement, to indicate that those who passed it judged that the
improvement was for the public convenience exclusively, and not fbr
the benefit of the particular district, the presumption is that they determined that those who were specially assessed would be specially
benefited : Xayor and Councils of Baltimore v. The -Johns Hopkinis
Hospital, 56 Md.
Whether an improvement authorized by the mayor and city council
of Baltimore will benefit the property along the line of such improvement, is a question left exclusively to their judgment, and their determination in the premises is final and conclusive. The courts have no
power to review such determination at the instance of the property
owners specially taxed: Id.
If a local assessment imposed for an improvement, directed to be
made, should so far transcend the limits of equality and reason that its
execution would cease to be a tax, or contribution to a common burden,
and become extortion and confiscation, it would be the duty of the
court in such case to interfere ta protect the citizen : Id.
.PersonalLiability of Owner-Assessment in Another Name.-The
owner of real estate is not personally liable for taxes assessed against
another as owner: City of Jefferson v. Mock, 74 Mo.
Corporation-Exeptionin Charter- To what Property applicable.
A provision in the charter of a corporation that it shall pay a certain
tax on its capital stock in lieu of all other taxes, exempts from taxation
only the property of the corporation necessary for its business: Bank
of Commerce v. State of Tennessee, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1881.
The charter of a bank provided for the payment of a tax on its capital stock "in lieu of all other taxes." It also authorized the bank to
purchase ground for use as a place of business, and to hold property
conveyed to it to secure debts. The bank bought a lot and erected a
building, using the first Roor for its business, and renting the other
floors. It also purchased three other lots at a sale under a trust-deed
made to it to secure a loan. Held, that the bank was liable for taxes
on the part of the building not used for its business, and also on the
other three lots of ground: Id.
TELEGRAPH.

Liability of Company for Negligence-Conditions RepeatingMeasure of Damages-Tradeterms in Afessage-Illegal Tr'ansaction.When a telegraph company, for a compensation, receives a message for
transmission, it is bound to perform its contract with integrity, skill and
diligence; and if, by reason of the want of any of these qualities, the
message be improperly transmitted, and injury accrues, the company will
be liable: West. Uiion Tel. Co. v. Blanchard, 66 Geo.
If it is necessary for the company, in transmitting messages with integrity, skill and diligence, to have them repeated, the duty of so doing
devolves upon it, not upon the sender: Id.
The company cannot, by any rule ot regulation of its own, protect
,itse.l against damages resulting from every degrge of negligence except
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gros negligence or fraud. Nor cin it limit the daomages to be recovered
to a return of the amount of toll paid: id.
A message in these terms, " Cover two hundred September and one
hundred August," was shown to be the ordinary expressions used in
the cotton trade, meaning that the person receiving the message should
sell for the sender two hundred bales of cotton deliverable in Apgust
and one hundred deliverable in September: Held, that it was not such
an obscure message as would limit the usual liability of the company: Id.
An agent can recover from his principal e±pense and loss incurred in
.carrying out a contract, even though such contract be illegal ; and if
such loss is caused by the negligent transmission of a telegram, the
principal, upon reimbursing the agent, may recover from the telegraph
.company: Id.
The illegality of the contract would not relieve the company from liability for its negligence: Id.
TRESPASS.

See CriminalLaw.

UNITED STATES COURTS.

See Judgment.

UNITED STATES.
Patentfor Land- Conclusiveness of-Al ining Claim - Validity of.A patent in a court of law is conclusive as to all matters properly determinable by the Land Department, when its action is within the scope
of its authority-that is, when it has jurisdiction under the law to
convey the land. In such court the patent is unassailable for mere
errors of judgment: &t. Louis S. & R. Co. v. Kemp, S. C. U. S., Oct.
Term 1881.
On the other hand, a patent may be collaterally impeached in any
action, and its operation as a conveyance defeated by showing that the
department had no jurisdiction-that is, that the law did not provide
for selling them, or that they had been reserved or dedicated to special
purposes, or had been previously transferred to others : 11.
There is nothing in the Acts of Congress which limits the size of a
mining claim for which a patent may issue. The limitations in sects.
2330, 2331 Rev. Stat. relate to locations, and not to patents : Id.
The owner of contiguous locations may consolidate them into one and
present but a single application for a patent therefor, and such patent
may be granted by the Land Department: Id.
WILL.
.ExecutoryDevise-Surviving Children- Grandchildren.-Awill bequeathed property to the executors of the testator, in trust for the sole
and separate use of the testator's daughter for life, "1and from and after
her death in trust for such child or children as she may leave, his, her
or their assigns for ever, but if my said daughter shall die leaving no
children.or child, then to my right heirs living at the time of their
death." Held, that such bequest created an executory devise which
vested on the death of the life usee in such of her children as survived
her. A child who died before the life usee, took nothing:
h7tite v.
Rowland, 66 Geo.
Grandchildren cannot take under a bequest to children unless there
be something in the will to indicate such intention by the tes.tator: Id.

